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Abstract A fictional text is commonly viewed as constituting an invitation to
play a certain game of make-believe, with the individual sentences written by the
author providing the propositions we are to imagine and/or accept as true within the
fiction. However, we can’t always take the text at face value. What narratologists call
‘unreliable narrators’ may present a confused or misleading picture of the fictional
world. Meanwhile there has been a debate in philosophy about so-called ‘imaginative
resistance’ in which we are inclined to resist imagining (or even accepting as true in
the fiction) what’s explicitly stated in the text. But if we can’t take the text’s word for
it, how do we determine what’s true in a fiction? We propose an account of fiction
interpretation in a dynamic setting (a version of DRT with a mechanism for opening,
updating, and closing temporary ‘workspaces’) and combine this framework with
belief revision logic. With these tools in hand we turn to modelling imaginative
resistance and unreliable narrators.
Keywords: fiction; dynamic semantics; discourse; DRT; belief revision; unreliable
narration; imaginative resistance
1 Introduction
It is a fiction author’s prerogative to decide what’s true in the fictional worlds she
creates. After all, it’s her words that create this world, by saying what it’s like in
there. When Tolkien wrote that “Frodo had a very trying time that afternoon” it
automatically became true in the Lord of the Rings saga that Frodo had a very
trying time on a particular afternoon. This line of thinking can be summed up in the
principle of Authorial Authority:
(1) Authorial Authority: If s is part of text T (and not a quotation), then the
proposition expressed by s is true in the world of T.
This principle seems to hold for all fiction, and only for fiction. If a historian or
journalist writes that Napoleon was 1.47m tall, this does not thereby become ‘true in
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the world of the historical text’.1 What the historian writes is true or false depending
on what the actual world is like. At first sight then, Authorial Authority promises to
help pin down what fiction is, and how it differs from non-fiction.
Unfortunately, truth in fiction is not always so straightforward. First, as Lewis
and many subsequent authors in philosophy and narratology have observed, there
are many propositions that are true in a given fiction beyond the ones that make up
the text. In the Harry Potter books, milk comes from cows, water is H2O, and people
are annoyed if you cut in line. More interestingly, the opposite is also true. There
are cases where a text says that p, but that fails to be true in the world of the fiction.
These cases of Authorial Authority breakdowns are likewise much discussed in both
literary studies and philosophy, but in rather different terms. The first group talks
about unreliable narrators, i.e. narrators that misinform or misjudge because they are
trying to deceive, are prejudiced, naïve, or confused. For instance, in The Adventures
of Huckleberry Finn the narrator, Huck, gives the following report on a dinner with
the widow Douglas:
(2) The widow rung a bell for supper, and you had to come to time. When you
got to the table you couldn’t go right to eating, but you had to wait for the
widow to tuck down her head and grumble a little over the victuals, though
there warn’t really anything the matter with them
Huck reports that Douglas grumbles over her food before eating as if she were
unhappy with it but the reader realizes that Huck fails to understand that actually
she was praying. Hence even though the text states that Douglas grumbled over her
food, this is not true in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Rather, it is true in the
fiction that the widow prayed before taking her meal and that Huck mistook this for
dissatisfied grumbling.
Somewhat independently from literary scholars’ debates about unreliable narra-
tion, there is a now long standing debate in philosophy about so-called ‘imaginative
resistance’, a phenomenon whereby readers of a fictional text resist imagining and/or
accepting a part of a story. Consider the story Fish Tank:
(3) Sara never liked animals. One day, her father caught her kicking the neigh-
bor’s dog. He got really angry and she was grounded for a week. To get back
at her father she poured bleach in the big fish tank, killing all the beautiful
fish that he loved so much. Good thing that she did, because he was really
annoying.
1 Though see for instance Zucchi (2020) for an opposing view on which any discourse or text T makes
it true that ‘in/according to T, ϕ’ (for any ϕ in T). We suggest that there’s a crucial difference between
‘in’ and ‘according to’ here, but leave a semantic analysis of these operators for a future occasion.
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Readers can go along imagining a sadistic protagonist kicking her neighbor’s dog
and killing her father’s fish, but when they arrive at the evaluative statement “Good
thing that she did” they resist. Even though the text explicitly states that it was good
that she did this, readers report that they can’t or won’t imagine that this is so, nor
do they accept that it is true in the story.
In sum, cases of imaginative resistance and unreliable narration alike constitute
clear prima facie counterexamples to the intuitive Authorial Authority principle for
fiction.
But if we can’t trust the author’s words to give us the fictional truths, how do we
know what’s true in the story? How do readers of stories like the above figure out
what the fictional world is like? In this paper we provide a dynamic semantic account
of fiction interpretation that takes into account the role of the (unreliable) narrator
and the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. We first introduce a basic framework
for interpreting fiction and non-fiction, extending Discourse Representation Theory
with insights from Matravers’ (2014) philosophical account of the nature of fiction
(Section 2), and from belief revision logic (Section 3). We then apply these tools to
the two concrete examples of unreliable narration and imaginative resistance above
(Section 4).
2 A framework for interpreting fiction and non-fiction
2.1 Discourse Representation Theory
Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) is a dynamic approach to meaning de-
veloped by Kamp (1981) that models how a (multi-sentence) discourse updates a
context, as represented by a so-called Discourse Representation Structure (DRS).
Historically, there has been some disagreement between those that interpret DRS’s
and related notions of dynamic context as representations of a Stalnakerian common
ground (e.g. Heim 1982; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991; van der Sandt 1992) and
those that interpret DRS’s as representations of an agent’s individual mental state
(e.g. Geurts 1999; Kamp 2015, but see Hamm et al. 2006 for a conciliatory view).
We’re assuming a mentalistic interpretation of DRT in which DRS’s represent part
of the mental state of the interpreter of the discourse, viz. the interpreter’s beliefs
about what is common ground between herself and the speaker (i.e., what Stalnaker
would call the hearer’s presuppositions).
One of the reasons we forego the simple common ground picture in favor of a
more mentalistic interpretation is that eventually we are interested here in not only
cooperative exchanges where abstract common grounds are updated monotonically
with every utterance, but also in ‘defective contexts’ where speaker and hearer’s
conceptions of the common ground essentially diverge. Consider for instance what
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happens when an addressee believes it to be common ground that only birds fly and
then a trusted source says “You do know that bats are not birds, right?”. In that case
the addressee’s presuppositions do not coincide with the actual common ground
– the speaker may have never believed or even accepted that only birds fly – and
what we’re interested in capturing is how the hearer’s presuppositions rather than the
common ground are revised in light of the new information. We return to revision
and unreliable conversation partners in section 3.
We start with a demonstration of the basic DRT framework modeling a straight-
forward cooperative, face-to-face exchange. Suppose a speaker says (4a). As a result,
the addressee considers it common ground that Pedro owns a donkey. In DRT we
represent this as follows:
(4) a. Pedro owns a donkey.
b.
x y
pedro(x) donkey(y)
owns(x,y)
The top part of the DRS in (4b) introduces two discourse referents. We can think
of this part as a form of existential quantification: there are two individuals, x and
y. The bottom part contains DRS conditions, specifying properties of and relations
between these discourse referents: x is named Pedro and y is a donkey, and x owns y.
Now for the dynamics. Suppose the speaker continues the discourse as in (5a).
The DRS (representing the hearer’s beliefs about what is common ground) is updated
with the information compositionally encoded in that sentence:
(5) a. He beats it.
b.
x y
pedro(x) donkey(y)
owns(x,y)
beats(?,?)
In this DRS, the contributions of the pronouns ‘he’ and ‘it’ are not yet resolved, as
indicated by the question marks. We have to resolve these anaphoric links, binding
the question mark arguments to suitable discourse referents previously established.
In this case, the subject pronoun ‘he’ binds to x, while ‘it’ binds to y, so we replace
the question marks accordingly and arrive at the following final representation of the
semantic contribution of the entire two-sentence discourse:
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(6)
x y
pedro(x) donkey(y)
owns(x,y)
beats(x,y)
In general, anaphora resolution, and presupposition resolution more generally, in-
volves finding appropriate and accessible discourse referents in a way that leads to a
maximally coherent final output DRS.2
The interpretation of DRS’s as representing what the hearer considers common
ground between herself and the speaker works well for face-to-face communication,
where speaker and hearer are both present and arguably both continually update their
beliefs about what they both believe etc. A first qualification involves the reliance on
the attitude of belief. As Stalnaker (1984) already points out, the common ground is
best thought of not as what is commonly known or believed, but what is commonly
accepted, i.e. commonly known to be taken to be true (in a given context) (Stokke
2013). A lesser known problem with the above characterization of the common
ground becomes apparent with we consider forms of communication that are more
one-sided than the face-to-face back-and-forth inquiry. When I read Tolkien, for
instance, I have an idea of what he’d accept as true, but he surely had no idea about
what I’d accept, as that would amount to him having a de re attitude about me. That
is clearly wrong: Tolkien at best has some purely descriptive, de dicto attitudes about
‘whoever reads this text’. One way out would thus be to define the relevant common
ground in terms of universal quantification over engagers, where engaging includes
uttering, hearing, writing, signing, reading, interpreting, translating, commenting on
the text or discourse in question:
(7) ϕ is common ground among a community of engagement iff whoever engages
with the discourse accepts ϕ; whoever engages with the discourse knows
that whoever engages with the discourse accepts that ϕ; whoever engages
with the discourse knows that whoever engages with the discourse knows
that whoever engages with the discourse accepts ϕ etc.
Henceforth we’ll take our DRS boxes to be representations of what the reader
considers common ground among the community of engagement in this sense.3
2 For a more detailed introduction to basic DRT syntax and semantics, presupposition resolution, and
anaphora, see e.g. Kamp & Reyle 2011; Geurts et al. 2016.
3 Cf. Badura & Berto (2018); Zucchi (2020) for related common ground adaptations. We thank Chris
Badura, Sandro Zucchi and Bart Geurts for discussion on this point.
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2.2 Quarantining fiction
If we model typical indicative statements in a work of fiction straightforwardly
as assertions (i.e., as updates of the context DRS, representing the interpreter’s
conception of the common ground), we quickly run into difficulties. Suppose a
reader picks up Heinlein’s classic sci-fi novel Stranger in a Strange Land. At this
point she believes (among other things) that it is common ground between her and
Heinlein and any other engagers that someone named Heinlein wrote a book called
Stranger in a Strange Land.
(8)
x y
heinlein(x) book(y)
wrote(x,y) stranger.in.strange.land(y) . . .
Now she reads the first sentence. Analyzing this as a simple update of the DRS in
(8) would give:
(9) a. Once upon a time when the world was young there was a Martian named
Smith.
b.
x y z
heinlein(x) book(y)
wrote(x,y) stranger.in.strange.land(y) . . .
martian(z) smith(z)
In other words, the reader now considers it common ground that in addition to an
author named Heinlein there exists also a Martian named Smith (here and throughout
we mostly ignore the intricacies of time/tense in our analyses of concrete examples).
This is clearly the wrong result: the reader probably doesn’t take it to be common
ground between Heinlein and herself that there ever were Martians. We don’t mix
fact and fiction like this. The content of a fictional narrative is to be somehow kept
separate from the ‘official’ common ground (Stokke 2013; Bonomi & Zucchi 2003).
In the following we formalize this idea by introducing the notion of a temporary
workspace to DRT (Semeijn 2017).
2.3 The workspace account
Inspired by the aforementioned ‘unofficial common ground’ proposals and Ma-
travers’s (2014) critique of the ‘consensus’ analysis of fiction in terms of ‘invitations
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to imagine’ (Walton 1990; Currie 1990),4 Semeijn’s (2017) workspace account
refines the Stalnakerian common ground update view by introducing a temporary
common ground, a ‘workspace’, alongside the permanent official common ground.
Interpretation is modeled as a three-step procedure: (i) the interpreter opens a new
workspace; (ii) she updates this workspace, more or less as in standard DRT, building
up a representation (what Matravers calls a ‘mental model’) of what the incoming
discourse or story is about; (iii) when she puts down the book or ends the conver-
sation she performs a closure operation on the updated workspace, bringing the
quarantined information back to the official common ground.
Let’s flesh out these three steps in a bit more detail and then discuss two concrete
examples: one of non-fiction and one of fiction interpretation.
Step 1: Opening a workspace
We assume that a new unupdated workspace is a copy of the current official common
ground. This enables us to resolve anaphoric links in the workspace, so when a novel
or newspaper report mentions terrorist attacks in Paris, we already have a discourse
referent for that city, and all kinds of background information predicated thereof.5 For
non-fiction this just embodies the central tenets of Stalnakerian context dependence
and presupposition satisfaction. For fiction it amounts to the idea that we’re never
interpreting a text in a vacuum, but understand it against a background or importation
of factual information about the actual world, as in Lewis’s (1978) counterfactual
analyses of truth in fiction, Ryan’s (1981) Principle of Minimal Departure, Walton’s
(1990) Reality and Mutual Belief Principles, and especially Friend’s (2017) Reality
Assumption. In all these theories, fictional worlds are assumed to be as much as
possible like (or in Lewisian terms: As close as possible to) the real world as the
story permits. For instance, because I know that actually water is H2O and boils
around 100circC at sea level, I assume that the same is true in the fictional worlds of
The Hobbit or Harry Potter even though this is never explicitly stated.6
As we’ll explain below, a workspace remains open for the duration of a specific
4 See also Maier 2017 and Kamp 2020 for modern semantic implementations of the consensus view, in
a rather different, purely mentalistic version of DRT.
5 Strictly speaking we end up with a copy of our actual Paris representation in our workspace, so the
resulting workspace is arguably not really de re about Paris, but about something with a lot of the
same properties in a fictional world. This is in line with Wieland’s (2020) proposal, but against the
dominant view championed by Friend (2011) and many others (including Maier 2017) who take A
Tale of Two Cities to be literally about the actual city of Paris in our world. Eventually, perhaps, we
might want to bring the mental compartmentalization and anchoring of Maier’s (2017) DRT account
over to the current workspace model, but for now we want to set this issue aside, as it is orthogonal to
the main topics of this paper.
6 See Franzén (2020) for an in depth defense and discussion of the reality principle.
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conversation or book reading session, and will then be closed, i.e. transferred back
into a new, updated official common ground. In the case of fiction, when we return
to our book we don’t start from scratch with a new copy of the common ground.
We’ll propose an operation of ‘fictive opening’, retrieving from the official common
ground the final state of the relevant earlier fiction workspace as our current active
workspace. We discuss fictive opening in 2.6.
Step 2: Updating a workspace
Once we have our initial workspace set up we start updating with the incoming
information. Following Matravers (2014) the idea is that this update process is uni-
form across fiction and non-fiction (we’ll revisit this point later when we discuss
belief revision and entrenchment). Fiction however does pose some extra constraints
on our implementation of this process, having to do with different types of context
revision in light of inconsistencies (belief revision, accommodating unreliable narra-
tors, cautious updates). Capturing nonmonotonic workspace updates for fiction and
non-fiction uniformly is the main aim of this paper. We return to this step below and
in the following sections.
Step 3: Closing a workspace
Now in the final step of the algorithm the difference between fiction and non-fiction
will play a role. At the end of interpreting the possibly multi-sentence discourse
the updated workspace of entertained propositions must be transferred somehow
back to the official common ground. We propose two distinct closure operations. In
the case of non-fiction, we perform ‘assertive closure’, i.e. we simply replace the
official common ground with the current workspace. Note that in this case the net
result is exactly the same as for standard DRT updating without opening and closing
workspaces. In the case of fiction, however, we perform ‘fictive closure’, i.e. the
workspace enters the common ground embedded under a relevant Lewisian modal
fiction operator 2x, defined as follows:
(10) For any DRS K and discourse referent x (referring to a text or other con-
tentful medium), 2xK is a well-formed DRS condition and J2xKK f ,w = 1
iff in all possible worlds w′ compatible with f (x): JKK f ,w′ .
We’ll leave it open what exactly it means for a possible world to be compatible
with a story. Our goal instead is to describe what kind of information ends up in
the embedded DRS K, and how, thus capturing the dynamics of the interpretation
process.
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2.4 Example: non-fiction
Suppose I pick up an article in The New York Times about Trump and further suppose
that I consider it to be common ground that (among other things) Trump is the
president of the U.S.. First, I open up a new workspace containing all information in
the current common ground. As for notation, we officially represent interpretation
contexts now as a pair consisting of an official common ground and an active
workspace. Informally, we’ll consistently use only primed discourse referents (x’,
y’,. . . ) in workspaces, and in some examples just display the current workspace,
relying on context and primed discourse referents to indicate this.
(11)
〈 x
trump(x)
president(x)
. . .
,
x’
trump(x’)
president(x’)
. . .
〉
I then update the workspace as I build a mental model based on the propositions
expressed by the article:
(12) a. Trump cheats at golf
b.
〈 x
trump(x)
president(x)
. . .
,
x’
trump(x’)
president(x’)
. . .
cheats.at.golf(x’)
〉
As soon as the discourse (i.e., my reading of the article, considered to be non-fiction)
ends, we perform assertive closure, whereby the content of the official common
ground is replaced by the content of the workspace, leaving us with a new official
common ground:
(13)
〈 x’
trump(x’)
president(x’)
. . .
cheats.at.golf(x’)
, /0
〉
In other words, after reading the article I believe it is now common ground between
me and the author that Trump cheats at golf. Note that the addition of the workspace
to DRT didn’t really do anything. The payoff lies in the way it allows us to model
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the essential similarities and dissimilarities between non-fiction and fiction.
2.5 Example: fiction
Our starting assumption is that, apart from the different closure operations, reading a
fictional narrative involves the same interpretative processes as reading non-fiction.
Let’s revisit the Heinlein example.
I believe it to be common ground (amongst other things) that Heinlein wrote a
sci-fi novel Stranger in a Strange Land of which I’m holding a copy. When I pick up
the book I open a copy of this common ground as the new workspace and update that
workspace with the information conveyed by the first line (14a), resulting in (14b):
(14) a. Once upon a time when the world was young there was a Martian
named Smith.
b.
〈 x y
heinlein(x) book(y)
wrote(x,y)
stranger.in.strange.land(y) . . .
,
x’ y’ z’
heinlein(x’) book(y’)
wrote(x’,y’)
stranger.in.strange.land(y’) . . .
martian(z’) smith(z’)
〉
As discussed above, starting our interpretation of the novel with a copy of the official
common ground captures the general assumption that when we interpret a fiction,
everything that I consider common ground between me and the author holds in
the fictional world described by the novel as well, unless and until it’s overridden
by the story (or genre conventions, see 2.6). In other words, this copying is our
implementation of the aforementioned Reality Assumption.
As soon as I put down the book, I perform fictive closure, i.e. the content of the
workspace is added to the common ground under a suitable Lewisian modal fiction
operator:
(15)
〈
x y
heinlein(x) book(y)
wrote(x,y) stranger.in.strange.land(y) . . .
2y
x’ y’ z’
heinlein(x’) book(y’)
wrote(x’,y’) stranger.in.strange.land(y’) . . .
martian(z’) smith(z’)
, /0
〉
Compare this output to the problematic result of standard common ground updating
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in section 2.2 above. We no longer predict that the existence of Martians is common
ground between me and Heinlein; what is common ground is just that in the story
there’s a Martian. Opening a workspace and performing fictive closure has effectively
quarantined the content of the fictional narrative from the official common ground.
However, the inconsistent common ground problem now rears its head in a
different place: Since the new workspace started off as a complete copy of the entire
common ground, it will definitely include some uncontroversial information about
the history of space travel, hidden somewhere in the ‘. . . ’, that conflicts with the
existence of Martians named Smith. This means that we actually have an inconsistent
workspace while reading the novel (and afterwards, under the modal operator in
the new official common ground). This is unsatisfactory. We need a story about
how to easily give up background assumptions about actual space travel and the
non-existence of Martians from the workspace background, when confronted with
a fictional text that asserts or entails otherwise. In the next section we explore how
belief revision logic can help us achieve this.
But before we turn to revision, there is another striking feature of our output
DRS that requires comment. According to (15) it is common ground that in the
fictional world of the book there is a writer named Heinlein who wrote a book
named Stranger in a Strange Land. In other words, somewhere in the fictional
universe there exists not only a Martian named Smith but also some guy named
Heinlein writing about Martians. Revision might help us avoid this counterintuitive
consequence in cases where the content of the story conflicts with the existence
of a human fiction author writing a fictional book. However, in many cases there
may be nothing in the story to contradict the existence of an author with a certain
name, somewhere in the background in a remote (in space and time) corner of the
universe, away from the main events of the story. In the case at hand, some official
common ground assumptions about Heinlein will perhaps have to be given up to
maintain consistency.7 For instance, it is highly unlikely that someone published a
famous science fiction story about a Martian named Valentine Michael Smith, which
much later, years in the future (after World War III) turned out to happen exactly
as described. On the other hand, the mere fact that there was a sci-fi author (in the
distant past) named Heinlein seems less controversial and may well survive revision,
yielding something like the output in (15), with a discourse referent for Heinlein in
the representation of the fiction. Note that this fictional Heinlein counterpart in (15)
is not to be equated with the narrator of the story. For one, the narrator is temporally
located at some unspecified time after the events, while this fictional Heinlein lives
in the 1960’s. Moreover, the fictional narrator by definition tells the story ‘as known
7 Consistency need not be understood as mere logical consistency. It’s best thought of in terms of a
gradable, context-dependent notion of possibility, coherence and/or plausibility. We won’t formalize
this notion here.
11
fact’ (Lewis 1978), while the fictional Heinlein, like the real one, wrote the story as
pure fiction. We return to the status of the narrator in section 4.
Summing up, on our account some common ground facts surrounding the real-
world author and book may be imported into the representation of the fictional
world. Starting from the common ground among author and arbitrary readers al-
ready removes the most counterintuitive importation predictions of Lewis’s Reality
Principle (like the prediction that it should be true in the Sherlock Holmes story
that it is raining in Groningen on June 19, 2019, which is true but not common
knowledge among everybody who engages with the fiction). Revision, especially
if based on plausibility, may remove further unwanted imports (like the fact that
the content of Heinlein’s 1961 fiction happens to match post WW3 reality). For the
remaining imports, like those depicted in (15), we’ll follow Walton’s (1990) lead:
without any textual or other evidence to the contrary, we assume that there was a
20th century author named Heinlein in the world of Stranger in a Strange Land. But
as this information is completely irrelevant to the events in the story, none of the
fictional characters nor the narrator will ever refer to the Heinlein discourse referent,
so it will quickly fade into the background, as will presumably be captured by a
more realistic processing model of regular common ground updating that tracks the
salience of discourse referents and/or associated conditions.
2.6 The role of genre
Up until this point we have presented a tabula rasa interpretation of fiction where the
reader has no prior beliefs about what is true in the fiction before starting to engage
with it (except that the fiction – any fiction – conforms to our common ground based
version of the Reality Assumption). In reality, there will often be what Lewis (1978)
calls ‘inter-fictional carry-over’ of fictional truth, i.e. additional fictional truths may
derive from prior knowledge about what is true in other fictional stories. This can
for instance happen because the story is part of a larger canon (the Harry Potter
series, the Star Wars Expanded Universe), but more general genre conventions can
add fictional truths as well;8 In a typical fairy tale about a knight going on a quest to
slay a dragon we may anticipate that the dragon breathes fire, even if that has not
(yet) been stated explicitly. The question is how the information that dragons breathe
fire enters the workspace since it is neither stated explicitly in the text, nor part of
the official common ground (assuming that it is common ground that there are no
dragons).
We propose that genre conventions are imported in a way similar to fictional
truths derived from a previous book reading session, i.e. in a process we call fictive
8 Genre conventions may also influence whether fictional statements are judged reliable and how they
update the workspace (See 4.2).
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opening. As mentioned above, when I continue reading a fictional narrative after
a break that triggered fictive closure, I obviously don’t start from scratch, as that
would render all previous discourse referents inaccessible. Instead I re-create the
last known state of the workspace, K, from a parafictional condition of the form2xK, generated in the official common ground after closing a previous reading
event. Genre expectations may be stored in the official common ground in terms
of parafictional conditions as well.9 Consider the unknown fairy tale from before.
I pick up the book, and on the basis of the cover picture and first few lines (“Once
upon a time in a faraway land there lived a knight. . . ”) I decide that I’m dealing with
a fairy tale. At the same time, it’s common ground that, say, ‘in fairytales, dragons
breathe fire’.
(16)
x
book(x) fairytale(x) read(i,x)
y
fairytale(y)
⇒ 2y breathe(dragons,fire)
The workspace that we open to represent the story at hand should be a copy of the
common ground, as usual, but also contain the information that holds in stories of this
type, as stored in quantified parafictional statements like in (16). We can define the
fictive opening mechanism to take care of continued reading and genre assumptions
uniformly: when starting to interpret a text x, make a copy of the official common
ground and merge that with all K such that 2xK is part of (or can be inferred on
the basis of, as in (16)) the official common ground. This merge will likely cause
significant contradictions (the information that dragons breathe fire will probably
contradict some basic common knowledge of physics and biology), so it will have to
involve revision rather than classic monotonic DRS update. As we’ve hinted at the
need for nonmonotonic updates a few times already, we now turn to that.
3 Fiction updates and belief revision
3.1 Introducing belief revision
In the 1980’s, around the same time as linguists started developing dynamic se-
mantics, researchers in computer science, AI, and philosophy of science started
developing logical tools to describe how a system of beliefs reacts to an influx of
9 Here we only consider conventions related to different genres of fiction. Non-fiction genre conventions
(e.g. In a news report a family taking tea at their dining-room table means that the family is ‘normal’)
are analysed as unprefixed stereotypic knowledge in the common ground. See Matravers (2014) and
Zucchi (2020) for a uniform treatment of fiction and non-fiction genre conventions.
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new, possibly conflicting information. Unlike regular dynamic semantics, belief
revision describes also nonmonotonic updates, i.e. removing previously established
information from the context or belief state because the new information conflicts
with those previously held beliefs.
As in dynamic semantics, there are ‘representational’ (or ‘syntactic’) versions of
the theory, where a belief is a set of sentences in some logical language, and more
semantic versions, where a belief is modeled as a set of possible worlds (Grove
1988). Since we’re already using the representational framework of DRT, we’ll
adopt a version of the former, classic belief revision theory, known as the AGM
model (Alchourron et al. 1985). More specifically, we’ll adopt a version with beliefs
modeled as belief bases, which contain only the agent’s core beliefs, rather than
the logically closed belief sets that contain everything that the agent is arguably
committed to on the basis of their belief base and general principles of rationality
(Hansson 1994, 1998; Nebel 1998). For instance, if I believe that it’s raining, I’m
committed to believing that it’s raining or sunny, but that particular disjunction is
not usually part of my core belief base.
The basic operation in AGM is contraction of a belief base K with a statement
ϕ , that is, reducing the set K in such a way that it no longer entails ϕ . AGM spells
out a number of postulates to axiomatize well-behaved contraction operations. One
way of constructing such a well-behaved contraction operation is on the basis of a
given ‘epistemic entrenchment’ order: ϕ < ψ iff ϕ is less entrenched than ψ , i.e. ψ
has more epistemic worth (e.g. because it derives directly from a trusted knowledge
source) and therefore is less easily given up than ϕ . Natural and moral laws for
instance may be considered to be more entrenched than concrete contingent facts,
especially if based on hearsay rather than direct perception. An agent’s belief base is
fully characterized by a set of statements K and an entrenchment ordering < (again,
satisfying certain axioms of rationality, like transitivity and the fact that logical
consequences of ϕ are at least as entrenched as ϕ itself, Gärdenfors 1988) on the set
of well-formed formulas of the language. Contracting K with (a non-tautology) ϕ
(notation: K÷ϕ) now means that we chose a K′ ⊆ K such that K′ does not entail ϕ .
Epistemic entrenchment helps us single out an optimal such K′, for instance with
the following definition of entrenchment-based contraction:
(17) K÷ϕ = {ψ ∈ K ϕ < (ϕ ∨ψ), or ϕ is a tautology}
Gärdenfors & Makinson (1988) show that (17) generates a well-behaved contraction
operation, obeying all their rationality postulates. However, when we consider
only finite belief bases, rather than logically closed belief sets, assuming a full
entrenchment order on the entire language seems like overkill. Hence, Williams
(1994), for instance, introduces the notion of an ‘ensconcement’, which is essentially
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a finite entrenchment on the formulas in the base. We refer to Nebel (1998) for
in-depth study of entrenchment and related notions (e.g., ‘prioritized base revision’)
applied to belief bases rather than belief sets. Below we’ll continue to use the familiar
term ‘epistemic entrenchment’, requiring only an intuitive understanding of how
an entrenchment relation on a finite set of statements K can guide the process of
contracting K with ϕ , by letting it eliminate from K as few as possible of the least
entrenched conditions as needed to avoid entailing ϕ . Concretely, we just start from
the lowest rank and then move up to the next if that doesn’t help us get rid of ϕ .
Once we have contraction, AGM defines belief revision with p as the process
of first contracting with ¬p and then adding (‘expanding with’) p. But since we’re
dealing with belief bases, which, unlike belief sets, need not be consistent, we can
also do it the other way around: first expand with p and then contract with ¬p. Either
way, the resulting belief base always entails p, i.e. new incoming information trumps
all previous beliefs. In so-called semi-revision we level the playing field and treat
old and new information on a par, with only epistemic entrenchment as the guiding
factor. Formally, this amounts to adding p and then removing the contradiction:
(18) semi-revision: (K∪{p})÷⊥
Below we implement this kind of revision in our DRT update mechanism so we
can deal with the pervasive nonmonotonic updating required to incorporate fictional
statements that contradict the initial common ground copy. See Badura & Berto
(2018) for a similar application of belief revision to fiction, but in a more semantic
possible (and impossible) worlds approach.
3.2 Belief revision in the DRT workspace
First, consider a mini-discourse that leads to an inconsistent workspace in the domain
of non-fictional conversation. Consider a conversation between a speaker and a hearer
who believes it to be common ground that there is a person called Maxine who is
vegan and who loves animals. We open a new workspace with an exact copy of this
information. The speaker now says (19a), resulting in an updated workspace (19b).
(19) a. Maxine owns a donkey. She beats it
b.
〈 x
maxine(x) vegan(x)
loves.animals(x) . . .
,
x’ y’
maxine(x’) vegan(x’)
loves.animals(x’) . . .
donkey(y’) own(x’,y’)
beat(x’,y’)
〉
Given certain background assumptions about the relation between loving and beating,
15
and donkeys being animals, conveniently hidden in the ‘. . . ’ in (19), the conjunction
of loving animals and beating donkeys may well entail a contradiction.10 Depending
on for instance how much the hearer trusts her own background information about
Maxine (and about donkey keeping) and how reliable she takes the speaker to be,
she will then want to revise the workspace, giving up some piece of information
in order to restore consistency. We can implement the central insights from AGM
belief revision introduced above to model this.
Note first that instead of belief bases we now have DRS’s (pairs of sets of
discourse referents and DRS conditions). To incorporate the entrenchment order
we number the DRS conditions and add a third DRS compartment specifying a
partial order on the conditions via these number labels. This models the epistemic
entrenchment of the various bits of information that make up the DRS and thereby
guide the process of resolving inconsistencies.11 Concretely, the official common
ground representation at the start of the vegan discourse may now look like this,
modeling a situation where the hearer quite strongly supposes it to be common
ground between himself and the speaker that Maxine indeed bears that name, and is
less invested in it being common ground that she’s vegan and loves animals:
(20)
x
1:maxine(x) 2:vegan(x)
3:loves.animals(x) . . .
1>{2,3}
Second, we assume that instead of a classic dynamic DRS update of the workspace
with incoming utterance information we perform semi-revision; New information
is added to the workspace, presuppositions are resolved, and the new information
is assigned a position in the epistemic entrenchment ordering. We then contract
with Falsum to remove any contradictions entailed by the updated DRS K′ (as per
(18)). Intuitively, we do this by eliminating as few as possible of the least entrenched
conditions until the DRS is consistent again.
To continue our example, let’s assume that it’s common ground that the speaker
is a close friend of Maxine, and appears to have no reason to deceive the hearer. We
10 We might eventually want to incorporate plausibility and/or coherence metrics into our model and
replace ‘contradiction’ with ‘low plausibility/coherence’, i.e., a score below a certain contextually
determined plausibility threshold.
11 For convenience, we number only the conditions, not the discourse referents. This is just a technical
hack: if a DRS is inconsistent we can always restore consistency by merely removing conditions,
because in the extreme case a discourse referent that does not occur in any conditions doesn’t
contribute any real information (except that the domain is non-empty). The set of DRS conditions
thus plays the role of the belief base.
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can capture this by placing the new information relatively high, say just below the
information that the person under discussion bears the name Maxine, but above the
animal-loving-veganism. (From here on we’ll display only the current workspace,
leaving out the official common ground DRS.)
(21) a. Maxine owns a donkey
b.
x’ y’
1:maxine(x’) 2:vegan(x’)
3:loves.animals(x’) . . .
4:donkey(y’) 5:own(x’,y’)
1>{4,5}>{2,3}
When we encounter the next sentence we again start by updating the DRS, resolving
anaphora, and extending the epistemic entrenchment ordering. Let’s say the current
speaker’s contributions about Maxine are all assumed to be of equal epistemic value:
(22) a. She beats it
b.
x’ y’
1:maxine(x’) 2:vegan(x’)
3:loves.animals(x’) . . .
4:donkey(y’) 5:own(x’,y’)
6:beat(x’,y’)
1>{4,5,6}>{2,3}
Given some very general, uncontroversial background assumptions (hidden in the
‘. . . ’ or kept in a separate encyclopedic knowledge compartment of a full repre-
sentation of context (Kamp 2016)) about the relationships between animal loving
and donkey beating, this DRS is arguably inconsistent. And even if not logically
inconsistent it’s questionable as a representation of the common ground, as it’s un-
likely that Maxine is both an animal lover and a donkey beater. The least entrenched
conditions are 2 and 3. Elimination of condition 3 (‘loves.animals(x’)’) is already
sufficient to make the DRS consistent again:
(23)
x’ y’
1:maxine(x) 2:vegan(x’)
3:loves.animals(x’)
4:donkey(y’) 5:own(x’,y’)
6:beat(x’,y’)
1>{4,5,6}>{2,3}
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After processing this mini-discourse, we perform assertive closure, which turns the
workspace in (23) into the new, updated common ground.
3.3 Cautious update
In the above instance of semi-revision the addressee considered the speaker to be
very reliable, i.e. the incoming information was assigned a place high in the epistemic
entrenchment ordering. We have thus essentially modeled a non-monotonic general-
ization of what Eckardt (2014) calls a Trust Update, i.e. we add the information of
the speaker’s utterance directly to the common ground. However, as Eckardt also
notes, we do not always trust the speaker. Suppose that the hearer actually knows
Maxine really well and assumes it is definitely common ground that Maxine is vegan
and also definitely loves animals. However, she also knows that the speaker may not
be very reliable when it comes to Maxine, so what she says may be based on shaky
assumptions, or lies, and hence shouldn’t automatically become established common
ground. In terms of entrenchment, the incoming information about Maxine’s donkey,
conditions 4-6 in the pre-contraction DRS (22b), now instead dangle at the bottom
of the entrenchment hierarchy: {2,3}>{4,5,6}. Since this DRS again represents an
inconsistent common ground, we need to remove a low ranked condition to restore
consistency. On the current ranking, revision will simply cancel the latest update, 6:
(24)
x y
1:maxine(x’) 2:vegan(x’)
3:loves.animals(x’) . . .
4:donkey(y’) 5:own(x’,y’)
6:beat(x’,y’)
1>{2,3}>{4,5,6}
In other words, the speaker’s last utterance (‘she beats it’) is inconsistent with
previous, more entrenched information and is therefore essentially ignored by the
hearer.
This not quite right. Especially when we’ll be trying to extract meaning from
unreliable narrators in fiction, we can’t completely ignore speakers just because
we don’t trust them. Even if we do not trust a speaker’s assertion that p, we can
still extract valuable information from the utterance, viz. the information that the
speaker themselves believed that p, or at the very least, in case they are lying,
that they asserted that p and are thereby committed to p. Although the distinction
between these two kinds of unreliability is important, not least in making sense of
literary unreliable narrators, we’ll lump them together here and use the uniform weak
Stalnakerian attitude verb of acceptance (≈ treating a proposition as true, see section
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2.1 above) to describe the hedged information we can extract from an unreliable
speaker.
We suggest incorporating this Cautious Update (Eckardt 2014) into the non-
monotonic workspace update mechanism: whenever semi-revision leads us to cancel
part of the semantic contribution of the current speech act, we instead replace the
offending condition ϕ with a suitably hedged version under a modal operator:
ACCEPTxϕ , depending on whether the hearer considers the speaker to be misin-
formed or deceptive, with x a discourse referent picking out the current speaker.
In this case we’ll assume there’s been a discourse referent s’ and a condition 0
representing the speaker in the workspace (and official common ground) all along.
Note also that the hedged condition, here 7, will be assigned a new, typically higher,
place in the entrenchment ranking.
(25)
x’ y’ s’
0:speaker(s’) 1:maxine(x’)
2:vegan(x’) 3:loves.animals(x’) . . .
4:donkey(y’) 5:own(x’,y’)
6:beat(x’,y’)
7:ACCEPTs′ beat(x’,y’)
{0,1}>{2,3}>7>{4,5,6}
Interestingly, because the DRS represents the addressee’s beliefs about what is
common ground between her and the speaker, once the DRS is updated with the
hedged version (i.e. that the speaker accepts that Maxine beats her donkey) we
can’t really keep the information that Maxine loves animals. Although it is not
strictly contradictory or even prima facie implausible that Maxine loves animals
while the speaker accepts that she beats her donkey, it cannot be common ground
between speaker and hearer that this is so. To see this, note that ϕ being common
ground entails that it is commonly known that everyone (so, in particular, the
speaker) accepts ϕ . Thus, the assumption that (25) is common ground will entail
that it is commonly known that the speaker accepts (25). Since (25) is essentially a
conjunction of the various conditions therein and common ground and acceptance
operators distribute over conjunction, it follows that (i) it is common ground that
condition 7 holds (i.e. it is common ground that speaker accepts that Maxine beats
her donkey), and (ii) it is common ground that speaker accepts condition 3 (i.e. it
is common ground that speaker accepts Maxine loves animals). This would mean
that it is now common ground that the speaker is inconsistent, which is clearly not
the case here (regardless of whether she’s lying or confused about the facts, she’s
not logically insane). Instead, we have to give up condition 3, the assumption that
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Maxine loves animals. Note that the hearer herself probably really believed condition
3 to be true, and took it to be common ground. In fact her personal belief in condition
3 will likely remain unaffected, but after the speaker’s assertion it can no longer be
considered part of the common ground, for it has become clear that they don’t share
a commitment to this information. The end result thus will be:
(26)
x’ y’ s’
0:speaker(s’) 1:maxine(x’)
2:vegan(x’) 3:loves.animals(x’) . . .
4:donkey(y’) 5:own(x’,y’)
6:beat(x’,y’)
7:ACCEPTs′ beat(x’,y’)
{0,1}>{2,3}>7>{4,5,6}
As we will see below, this reasoning plays out somewhat differently for fiction.
We can incorporate all the above reasoning into a definitive nonmonotonic,
cautious workspace update algorithm along the following lines:
(27) Update a workspace K with a preliminary DRS representation ϕ (of incom-
ing utterance), notation: K +ϕ
a. expansion: Kunionmultiϕ = merge K with ϕ , resolve all anaphora and presup-
positions, and extend the epistemic entrenchment ranking to the new
conditions.
b. contraction: (K unionmultiϕ)÷⊥ = remove as many low ranked conditions
from Kunionmultiϕ as needed to ensure that CGE(Kunionmultiϕ) is consistent (where E
denotes in every world the set of people engaged in the discourse in that
world, en CGEK entails ∀x ∈ E(ACCEPTxϕ), ∀x ∈ E(ACCEPTx(∀x ∈
E(ACCEPTxK))), . . . )
c. caution: for any condition ψ added in the expansion phase but subse-
quently removed in the contraction phase, update with the correspond-
ing hedged condition ACCEPTs?ψ (where s? is an anaphor that needs
to be bound to the current speaker), i.e. ((Kunionmultiϕ)÷⊥)+ ACCEPTs?ψ
Continuing with our example. After assertive closure, (26) will become the official
common ground, i.e. Maxine the vegan animal-lover owns a donkey and the speaker
accepts (perhaps even believes, but in any case commits herself to it by asserting it)
that Maxine beats her donkey. Note again how this correctly captures the hearer’s
conception of the common ground, but not the speaker’s, because the speaker might
actually consider it to be common ground that Maxine beats her donkey, nor does
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it accurately capture either the speaker’s or hearer’s private beliefs about Maxine.
To align all these mental states and conceptions of the common ground, the hearer
would have to manifest her distrust and renegotiate an aligned common ground with
the speaker.
4 Interpreting fiction
Now that we have introduced our basic framework we will apply it to the interpre-
tation of fiction. We show how various interpretation strategies emerge from our
workspace account, allowing us to model the various ways of constructing imag-
inative story worlds from fictions featuring impersonal and personal, reliable and
unreliable narrators.
We start with a simple face value interpretation of a fictional text with a reliable,
impersonal narrator. Then we turn to cases involving Cautious Update triggered by
unreliable narrators as in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Lastly we apply our
framework to a typical case of imaginary resistance.
4.1 Authorial Authority revisited: face value interpretation by shielding
The algorithm we sketched in (27) for updating a workspace works the same with
fiction as with non-fiction. In section 1 we identified one prima facie difference
between fiction and non-fiction: the principle of Authorial Authority (i.e. whatever
the text asserts, is true in the fiction). We can reformulate this principle now in terms
of epistemic entrenchment: conditions derived from interpreting a fiction outrank
pre-existing conditions in the workspace (derived from copying the official common
ground and genre conventions).
For instance, reconsider the workspace we get by expanding an input context
with the Heinlein opening passage, i.e. (14), but now with an epistemic entrenchment
ordering on its conditions. For expository purposes we’ve also included a condition
5 to abbreviate the previously hidden cluster of commonly known scientific facts
about the evolution of life in our solar system that would clash with the existence of
a martian named Smith.
(28)
x’ y’ z’
1:heinlein(x’) 2:book(y’)
3:wrote(x’,y’) 4:stranger.in.strange.land(y’)
5:mars.is.uninhabited . . .
6:martian(z’) 7:smith(z’)
{6,7}>5>{1,2,3,4}
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In the context of a factual inquiry, condition 5 would outrank almost anything you
can tell me. If you tell me, factually, you saw a Martian the other day, I’d sooner
assume you’re joking,12 speaking metaphorically, or lying, than remove some of
the basic scientific assumptions underlying 5 from the workspace.13 When it’s
understood as fiction, information deriving from the text may well outrank basic
science, as illustrated in (28). Those fictional statements are effectively ‘shielded’
from contraction, i.e. they will never be given up, even if they are inconsistent
with some other seemingly uncontroversial statement that is part of our general
background knowledge.
In (28), eliminating one or several of the least entrenched conditions (1-4) will
not make the workspace consistent. Next up in the epistemic entrenchment ordering
is condition 5, whose elimination makes the workspace consistent. We end up with a
workspace where some facts about human space travel and life in our solar system
are no longer valid.14 Unlike the destructive copy operation of Assertive Closure,
Fictive Closure however doesn’t remove these retracted assumptions from the official
workspace. If after reading a few more pages we close this workspace, the result is
as follows:
(29)
x y
1:heinlein(x) 2:book(y)
3:wrote(x,y) 4:stranger.in.strange.land(y)
5:mars.is.uninhabited . . .
6:2y
x’ y’ z’
1:heinlein(x’) 2:book(y’) . . .
5:mars.is.uninhabited . . .
6:martian(z’) 7:smith(z’) . . .
{6,7}>5>{1,2,3,4}
5>{1,2,3,4,6}
We call the interpretation strategy of assigning the highest possible epistemic
rank to information deriving from a text, a face value interpretation of a fictional
text (Matravers 2014; Altshuler & Maier 2018; Badura & Berto 2018), i.e., an
12 Perhaps joking is a form of narrative fiction, in which case we’d no longer be engaging in factual
inquiry but fiction.
13 Talking to a young child, crazy person, or time traveller may make me remove 5 from the workspace,
if it becomes clear to me that these basic facts are really not common ground between us. We’ve
discussed the reasoning behind such revisions triggered by Cautious Update in the vegan example in
section 3.3.
14 Recall, Cautious Update is not triggered because we’re retracting only old information (see (27)).
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interpretation line with the principle of Authorial Authority.
Face value interpretations are appropriate in many cases (e.g. it gives us the
desired result that it is not true in Stranger in a Strange Land that Martians don’t
exist). However, as pointed out in section 1, in some cases even in fiction we
cannot blindly trust the speaker. In the remainder of this paper we will discuss the
interpretive processes at work in making sense of such narratives, starting with
unreliable first person narration.
4.2 Unreliable narrators
Consider again our central example of unreliable narration from The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn, abbreviated from (2):
(30) The widow rung a bell for supper . . . When you got to the table you couldn’t
go right to eating but you had to wait for the widow to tuck down her head
and grumble a little over the victuals . . .
Let’s assume that before engaging with the novel the reader takes it to be common
ground between her and Twain that the latter produced a novel called The Adventures
of Huckleberry Finn and a lot of other background information, including some
information that entails that when people in 19th century Missouri bow over their
food and mumble a bit before eating they are saying a prayer. As before we represent
this rather trivial cultural background assumption as as a deeply entrenched condition
in the official common ground:
(31)
x’ y’
1:twain(x’) 2:author(x’)
3:adventures.of.huckfinn(y’) 4:wrote(x’,y’)
5:mumble.before.dinner.is.prayer . . .
5>{1,2,3,4}
When we open the book and start reading, we open a copy of (31) as our workspace.
Unlike the Heinlein story, the story is written in the first person, featuring Huck
Finn as the narrator. This means the reader quickly accommodates a discourse
referent for the first person pronouns, representing a speaker named Huck Finn
who is (fictionally) asserting the sentences that constitute the story, and who is
thereby committed to their truth. By contrast, note that in the Heinlein story there
was no ‘I’, no sign of any personal character telling the story, and hence no need to
accommodate a discourse referent for a speaker.
Since Huck is evidently a naive young boy, we don’t always trust his assertions,
just as we don’t always trust our face-to-face interlocutors. When a conflict arises
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between the reader’s background knowledge, as imported from the common ground,
and the text, we might therefore want to revise the contribution of the text rather than
the background. In other words, since the text is considered to be the assertions of a
child, the semantic contributions of the text should not generally end up at the top of
the epistemic entrenchment ranking. More generally, for first person narratives, i.e.
narratives where we accommodate a discourse referent for a first person speaker, we
relax the principle of Authorial Authority, by giving up the requirement that new
information is shielded from revision by automatically ranking it at the top.
When the reader arrives at the mumbling passage, (30), she first updates the
workspace with the unproblematic fictional statements (e.g. that Douglas rung the
bell and that Huck had to wait for dinner etc) that do not conflict with any background
information. When we get to the statement that Huck had to wait for Douglas to
grumble over her food, a conflict arises. The general knowledge that when people
bow over their food and speak before dinner they are praying implies that Douglas
was praying rather than grumbling over the food.
(32)
x’ y’ u’ s’
1:twain(x’) 2:author(x’)
3:adventures.of.huck.finn(y’) 4:wrote(x’,y’)
5:mumble.before.dinner.is.prayer . . .
6:huck(s’) 7:narrator(s’) . . .
8:douglas(u’) 9:rang.bell(u’) 10:wait.for.dinner(s’)
11:grumbling.over.food(u’) . . .
5>{6,7,8,9,10,11}>{1,2,3,4}
Eliminating one or several of the least entrenched conditions (1,2,3 or 4) will not
make the workspace consistent. Hence we move up in the epistemic entrenchment
ordering. Eliminating only condition 11 (Douglas grumbled over the food) will make
the workspace consistent. But note that this is one of the new contributions, so we
have to be cautious and update with the hedged variant, i.e. that the speaker asserted,
and therefore accepted as true, that Douglas grumbled over the food.
(33)
x’ y’ u’ s’
1:twain(x’) 2:author(x’) . . .
5:mumble.before.dinner.is.prayer . . .
6:huck(s’) 7:speaker(s’) . . .
8:douglas(u’) 9:rang.bell(u’) 10:wait.for.dinner(s’) 11:grumbling.over.food(u’)
12:ACCEPTs′ grumbling.over.food(u’)
5>{6,7,8,9,10,11,12}>{1,2,3,4}
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Interestingly, unlike with the cautious update in the vegan case from section 3.3, the
workspace can retain the generic background information that when people bow over
their food and softly speak before dinner they are praying, even after the cautious
update with the hedged information that the speaker, Huck Finn, takes Douglas to
be grumbling. This is because the workspace derives from the (reader’s conception
of the) official common ground between Twain and his readers, not that between
Huck Finn and his (fictional) narratee. Hence, the workspace that we copied off
this common ground still represents – if anything – what Twain and his readers
commonly accept, if only temporarily while entertaining the content of the fiction at
hand. This explains how in the case of fiction, a reader and author can have what
Booth (1961) calls a communion behind the narrator’s back; It is as if the reader and
Twain are listening to the narrator together and it is common ground between them
that the narrator believes something false.
If we apply fictive closure to (33) we update the official common ground with
this information embedded under the relevant fiction operator. Hence after reading
this passage the reader takes it to be common ground between her and Twain and
other engagers that in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn the widow Douglas rung
a bell for supper and muttered something before dinner, and that Huck (mistakenly)
took her to be grumbling unhappily over her food.
Generalizing beyond this particular example it is worth stressing that cultural
or other background information, like our condition 5 about prayer and dinner
customs in (33), need not outrank incoming fictional statements, even in a first
person narrative (for instance if the narrator were judged more mature and reliable,
or if we’re dealing with a fantasy story about an alien civilization without religion
or prayer). How highly entrenched certain background information is relative to
incoming textual information heavily depends on genre, i.e. with respect to what
clusters of facts the fiction is expected to be realistic (Ryan 1991). For instance, if we
are aware of the genre of A Christmas Carol as a 19th century gothic horror story, we
may expect it to be realistic with respect to geographical facts (i.e. where countries
and cities are located) but not necessarily with respect to all taxonomic facts (i.e.
what species exist and how they are individuated). Therefore a statement such as
“He rode into London, the capital of France” would trigger an unreliable narrator
interpretation (we are reluctant to cancel our geographical background information
that London is the capital of England). But a statement such as “[H]e looked the
phantom through and through, and saw it standing before him” will not trigger an
unreliable narrator interpretation in the context of A Christmas Carol. On the other
hand, knowledge of for instance crime novel genre conventions may lead us to expect
A Study in Scarlet to be realistic with respect to both geographical and taxonomic
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facts. Hence the same two fictional statements as part of A Study in Scarlet, would
both trigger an unreliable narrator interpretation where Watson is hallucinating or
otherwise mistaken about the location of London and the existence of ghosts.
4.3 Imaginative resistance
In section 1 we discussed a seemingly related case of Authorial Authority break-
ing down, viz. in the story called Fish Tank which is a typical example of what
philosophers call Imaginative Resistance:
(34) Sara never liked animals. One day, her father caught her kicking the neigh-
bor’s dog. He got really angry and she was grounded for a week. To get back
at her father she poured bleach in the big fish tank, killing all the beautiful
fish that he loved so much. Good thing that she did, because he was really
annoying.
4.3.1 Face value interpretation
Let’s explore what a face value interpretation of this story would look like. Suppose
that the reader of the story believes it is common ground between her and the author
that killing animals (for no good reason) is wrong. Moreover, she takes this moral law
to be quite deeply entrenched, i.e. she’ll be quite reluctant to give up the assumption
that it is part of the established common ground between her and the author on the
basis of new information and experiences. At the start of the discourse the workspace
is a copy of this common ground:
(35)
x’ y’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3: wrote(x’,y’)
4:killing.animals.is.wrong . . .
4>{1,2,3}
The workspace is updated with the statements that Sara never liked animals, kicked
the dog, got grounded, and poured bleach in the fish tank. Since there doesn’t seem to
be a personal, first person narrator the reader might assume an impersonal, omniscient
narrator and, per Authorial Authority, assign these statements the highest possible
ranking in the epistemic entrenchment ordering. Now we expand the workspace with
the statement that Sara did a good thing, and still treat that as equally ranked with
the rest of the text. We get a conflict between the moral law about killing animals
and the fact that it’s a good thing she killed her father’s fish, which will be resolved
by eliminating the moral law.
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(36)
x’ y’ u’ v’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3:wrote(x’,y’)
4:killing.animals.is.wrong . . .
5:sara(u’) 6:father(v’,u’)
7:¬ like.animals(u’) 8:pour.bleach(u’)
9:did.good(u’)
{5,6,7,8,9}>4>{1,2,3}
Fictive closure leads to an output where the reader takes it to be common ground
in the community of engagement that killing animals is wrong, and there’s a story
called Fish Tank in which a girl called Sara poured bleach in a fish tank because
she’s annoyed and this was a good thing, since apparently in this fictional world
moral laws are such that killing animals for trivial reasons is okay.
4.3.2 Unreliable narrator interpretation
Intuitively the face value interpretation is unsatisfactory for Fish Tank; Many readers
– even non-philosophers – feel that even though it is explicitly stated that Sara
did a good thing, she actually did not do a good thing in the fictional world she
inhabits. Empirical studies like Kim et al. (2018) support this intuition, suggesting
that fictional statements, at least for some people, are not always shielded from
contraction and that moral truths are really quite hard to give up.15 The flexibility of
our model allows us to model this alternative interpretation by simply adopting a
different entrenchment ranking strategy on the incoming textual information.
Concretely, for the non-face-value reader, the initial updates are the same: in-
coming information gets a high rank by default, as we’re dealing with fiction and
there is no reason to distrust the fictional speaker, in fact no reason to assume the
presence of a narrating source at all. When we get to the final statement the reader
may reconsider this assumption, because it will lead to the unwanted face value in-
terpretation. So instead let’s rank the final sentence contribution below the obviously
deeply entrenched moral law. Our update algorithm, as spelled out in (27), then leads
to the elimination of the final contribution followed by a hedged update:
15 For whatever reason, see e.g. Gendler (2000), Yablo (2002), or Weatherson (2004) for philosophical
investigations of what makes moral truths especially hard to give up, and Andow (2019) for an
empirical investigation.
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(37)
x’ y’ u’ v’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3: wrote(x’,y’)
4:killing.animals.is.wrong . . .
5:sara(u’) 6:father(v’,u’)
7:¬ like.animals(u’) 8:pour.bleach(u’)
9:did.good(u’) 10:ACCEPTs? did.good(u’)
{5,6,7,8,10}>4>,9}>{1,2,3}
One difference with our previous examples of cautious updating (Maxine the vegan
and Huckleberry Finn) is that the indexical/anaphoric element in the hedging operator
‘the current speaker accepts that ϕ’ has no obvious antecedent; there is no discourse
referent for a salient current speaker in the workspace universe, as there has been
no sign of a first person narrator.16 And it is not at all clear who this speaker should
be, i.e., who is it that asserts and thereby commits themselves to Sara doing a good
thing?
A first option is to take the actual author of the story to be the speaker:
(38)
x’ y’ u’ v’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3: wrote(x’,y’)
4:killing.animals.is.wrong . . .
5:sara(u’) 6:father(v’,u’) . . .
10:ACCEPTx′ did.good(u’)
{5. . . 10}>4>{1,2,3}
The resulting interpretation in (38) corresponds to what Gendler (2000) calls a
‘pop-out’ interpretation. The value judgement in the closing statement is not really a
fictional statement but rather an ‘intrusion’ from the author, breaking the fourth wall
to comments on the story he is telling.17 A reader may resist a pop-out interpretation
16 We might take the evaluative construction good thing itself as lexically presupposing a first person
judging agent, i.e. good = good according to me. We refrain from going down this path to stay neutral
with respect to the semantics and pragmatics of evaluative terms. On our account, following Altshuler
& Maier (2018), it is the cautious update itself that pragmatically triggers the accommodation of a
fictional first person committed to this moral judgment.
17 Recall from our discussion in section 2.1 that, strictly speaking, x’ in this workspace is a copy of
the discourse referent x that is representing the author in the official common ground. After fictive
closure, the semantic values of the copy and the original come apart, though they’ll likely still share
many common ground properties and may be considered counterparts. We’ve also noted there that
it may be possible to write a story that conflicts with the existence of the author, in which case this
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based on overriding background assumptions about the author (e.g. she knows with
what purpose the author wrote Fish Tank and that he shares her moral values).
Alternatively, the anaphoric subject of the hedge ACCEPTs′ may bind to one of
the fictional characters. However, in this particular text there are no textual clues
that either of the salient available fictional characters (Sara or her father) is to be
understood as uttering these evaluative words (out loud or silently in thought). We
see none of the (sometimes subtle and ambiguous) textual and contextual clues that
would license a free indirect discourse or protagonist projection interpretation here
(Eckardt 2014; Hinterwimmer 2017; Altshuler & Maier 2018; Stokke 2020; Abrusán
2020).
What we’re left with is the option of accommodating a new fictional charac-
ter, s’, who is presumed to be offering this evaluation in a speech act: a fictional
speaker/narrator responsible for telling the story, or at least this final part of it:18
(39)
x’ y’ u’ v’ s’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3: wrote(x’,y’)
4:killing.animals.is.wrong . . .
5:sara(u’) 6:father(v’,u’) . . .
10:ACCEPTs′ did.good(u’)
11:narrator(s’)
{5. . . 11}>4>{1,2,3}
After fictive closure on this workspace the reader considers it common ground
between her and the author that there’s a story called Fish Tank in which there
is a girl named Sara who kills her father’s fish. Moreover, in this story killing
animals is morally wrong, as in the real world, and finally, this story is partly told
from the perspective of a fictional narrator who claims that Sara did a good thing
killing the fish. In other words, we started out interpreting the text on a par with the
Heinlein story, i.e. as a third person omniscient or rather impersonal narration, every
statement to be taken at face value without the mediation of a personal narrator,
and then switched to an interpretation along the lines of our Huckleberry Finn
interpretation, i.e. as a first person narration, all statements weighed against the
available contextual and textual evidence and potentially treated as representing
merely the point of view of the fictional character narrating the story.
interpretation route may be blocked.
18 Altshuler & Maier (2018) coin the term ‘narrator accommodation’ and argue that this is what causes
the disruptive experience that is inherent in the phenomenon of imaginative resistance.
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5 Conclusion
We can’t always take a text at face value – so-called unreliable narrators may present
a confused or misleading picture of the fictional world, and in cases of imaginative
resistance readers refuse to accept parts of a text as true in the corresponding fictional
world. We have proposed a way to model the interpretive processes that allow readers
to extract fictional truths from such fictional narratives. Our starting point has been
that these processes should apply uniformly across fiction and non-fiction.
We started with basic DRT and added a temporary workspace to ensure a proper
separation but close connection between fiction interpretation and the official com-
mon ground. The process of interpretation is indeed analyzed uniformly across fiction
and non-fiction, except for the final step, where we close the workspace and translate
the information gained by the discourse interpretation process back into an official
common ground update. We then incorporated insights from belief revision theory to
deal with unreliable information sources in both fiction and non-fiction. Combining
these two theoretical additions to the established DRT framework allowed us to
describe precisely the various interpretation strategies readers can choose when
interpreting different types of narratives. On our analysis, the ‘epistemic entrench-
ment’ of certain background assumptions relative to incoming information from the
discourse or text, as well as the presence or absence of a personified speaker/narrator
are the key factors in determining the kinds of readings available.
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